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ABSTRACT 
A number of pre-existing teams are trained to operate in crisis. These 
teams can be found in aviation, navy, nuclear power, offshore oil, air traffic 
control facilities, and trauma centers. Understanding how to support pre-existing 
teams like these, with IT is essential. To date, most support for these teams is 
automation support such as an electronic checklist for an airplane flight crew 
responding to an engine fire rather than collaboration support such as linking 
paramedics in the field to doctors in emergency rooms. While automated support 
is rapidly developing, very little consideration has been given to enhancing the 
collaboration support for teams that face crisis. With advances in network 
capacity and sensors, IT has enabled pre-existing teams that face crisis the 
opportunity to obtain collaboration support from others in the organization. 
Collaboration with other human experts is necessary to aid problem discovery 
and to consider ramifications of responses. Here we suggest a preliminary set of 
IT system guiding principles to support collaboration for a particular, but 
common type of pre-existing team that faces crisis. These principles are based on 
two frameworks that have been developed to mitigate the effects of crisis. One is 
an organizational approach called the High Reliability Organization (HRO); the 
other, a team approach, was developed in the aviation community known as 
Crew Resource Management (CRM). Here we briefly explain each approach, 
highlight their principles, and then suggest principles of a Collaboration Crisis 




Advances in IT have enabled the 
creation of new types of organizational teams 
(Fulk and DeSanctis 1995; Jarvenpaa and Ives 
1994). In addition, organizations are engaging 
in high risk activities as the business 
environment becomes more complex and the 
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rewards increase for successful high stakes 
processes (Morrison, Kelly, Moore, and 
Hutchins 2000; Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). To 
mitigate this risk, organizations increasingly 
rely on highly trained teams to manage high 
stakes processes in which a crisis may occur 
(Serfaty, Entin, and Johnston 1998; Seeger et 
al. 2003). Unfortunately, research on these 
types of teams and their IT needs is rare as 
most crisis research has studied environmental 
or terrorism events (Turoff, Chumer, Van de 
Walle, and Yao 2004), organizational 
responses to crisis (Hale, Dulek and Hale 
2005; Kim 1998), or other types of crisis 
teams such as interorganizational teams (Aedo 
et al. 2006; Chen and Dahanayake 2006), 
technology teams (De Bruijne, Van Eeten, 
Roe, and Schulman 2006) and disaster 
recovery teams (Robert and Lajtha 2002). 
Finally, still other research has investigated 
particular examples of these teams such as 
flight crews, firefighters, or paramedics 
(Helmreich 2000, McKinney 2004). 
While large scale disasters and 
organizational crises may last several weeks, 
here our focus is on the immediate response to 
a crisis by a particular but common type of 
pre-existing team of professionals. These crisis 
teams can be found in civilian aviation, the 
merchant navy, the nuclear power industry, 
aviation maintenance, the offshore oil 
industry, air traffic control facilities, trauma 
centers, medicine, fire fighting agencies, law 
enforcement, counter terrorism units, 
emergency rooms, combat units, container 
inspection teams at ports, and homeland 
security teams. These teams share distinct 
features: they are comprised of a small number 
of highly trained professionals within one 
organization, they are co-located at the site of 
the crisis, the team is trained to face life-
threatening risk, the team has the authority to 
make the key decisions which are typically 
irreversible, the team has a prior history of 
CONTRIBUTION 
This paper contributes to IS research in a number of ways.  To our best knowledge, it is 
the first IS crisis paper that examines a particular type of preexisting team.  Most all other 
crisis and IS research addresses large scale disasters, organizational responses, or crisis teams 
with other characteristics (e.g. ad hoc, widely dispersed or interorganizational teams).  During 
a time of increased terror activities, natural disasters, and man made crises, supporting this 
common but particular type of team with a conceptually sound IT system is both possible and 
important.   
Secondly, to our knowledge this work is the first IS study to site Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) research.  IS research has long investigated and supported team 
behaviors.  However, this body of research has not used insights developed by CRM 
researchers investigating flight deck team interactions.  Most IS crisis team research has 
focused on ad hoc teams, or organizational teams not in crisis.   
Finally, most of the limited research to date on teams in crisis has focused on automated 
support.  One example of a preexisting team is a flightdeck crew.  For these teams research has 
emphasized automated support such as computer displays, electronic checklists, or access to 
archived knowledge.  Here we suggest that with advances in sensor and network capabilities, 
robust IS systems can be developed that support collaboration needs of preexisting teams with 
other professionals outside of the crisis environment. 
By identifying a type of previously unstudied team (a particular, but most common type 
of preexisting team in crisis), an underserved need (collaboration), and new body of research 
(CRM), we hope to begin a discussion that will lead to development and design of an 
important new type of team IS.  To that end, this study provides an initial list of guiding 
principles for IT systems to support the collaboration needs of teams in crisis. 
This research is expected to be interesting to IS researchers building IT solutions for 
professional teams in industries with substantial risk.  It may prove interesting to a broader 
audience as it identifies an increasingly common type of professional team for whom 
technology solutions can be developed. 
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work together during routine operations, and 
the team can collaborate with other 
professionals not physically located with them. 
While research has supported each of these 
teams, this report is the first to classify them 
into a particular type for the purpose of 
making suggestions common to all. The most 
significant differences among pre-existing 
teams, large scale, and organizational crises 
are summarized in Table 1.  
The types of crisis are not completely 
independent. Large scale disasters are often 
the impetus for the creation of organizational 
and pre-existing team crisis. The 9/11 disaster 
put organizations such as the New York Police 
and Fire Departments in a crisis as well as a 
number of their pre-existing teams such as fire 
fighters and riot control teams. In addition, 
these three levels of crisis also share several 
characteristics. At each level decision makers 
face high risk and make binding decisions 
under time pressure and in short time horizons 
with incomplete information. Further, for each 
level, everything in a crisis is an exception to 
the norm (Turoff et al. 2004). Because these 
crisis types share some common elements, a 
number of IT system design principles 
identified for large scale crisis should be 
considered for pre-existing teams. These 
guidelines are not repeated in the text of this 
report (see Appendix A for a list of design 
principles for a Dynamic Emergency Response 
Management IS (Turoff et al. 2004)). 
As mentioned, there are other types of 
teams that respond to crisis. For example 
distributed teams of IT professionals from a 
variety of organizations may be called on to 
respond to a security threat to the Internet, or a 
top level crisis response team may have to 
respond to a large scale disaster. These teams 
are important to study also, but are not 
included here as they differ in important ways 
from our pre-existing teams. These differences 
include a number of characteristics, such as 
loosely organized, varying degrees of 
familiarity, physically dispersed, not life 
threatening, and longer time horizon. 
Collaboration 
Collaborative support for pre-existing 
teams in the past was limited by the available 
technology (e.g. compatible radios and phone 
systems). Historically, flight crews, fire 
fighting teams, or emergency room units could 
not be collaboratively supported as only the 
team in crisis knew the local conditions and 
had access to the stand alone computers that 
produced and manipulated the crisis data. 
Teams in crisis had only their immediate 
resources at hand or preprogrammed 
automated support. Now, with advances in 
network capacity and sensors, IT has stretched 
that hand and teams that face crisis can obtain
 
Table 1: Types and Attributes of Crisis 
 Large Scale Disaster 
Crisis 
Organizational Crisis Pre-existing Team Crisis  
Examples 9/11; Katrina; Bhopal, 
Three Mile Island 
Enron; NASA; Firestone Aviation, surgery 
Recent Studies in Crisis 
Literature 
Hale et al. 2005; Turoff 
2002 
Weick & Sutcliffe 2001; 







lives at stake, crisis 
responders move to 
location, key decisions 





at stake, decisions made 
over days 
Localized actions, hi 
tech system or personal 
breakdown, crisis team 
present prior to crisis 
initiation, all decisions 
short time horizon made 





hierarchy, hundreds of 
actors, from local state, 
or federal agencies and 
private organizations 
Centralized, formal 
hierarchy, tens of actors, 
from one organization 
(public or private) 
Co-located formal 
hierarchy, few actors, 
highly trained, from one 




collaboration support from others in the 
organization (Chen and Dahanayake 2006). 
These organizational experts can now see real-
time data from the crisis, interact with 
knowledge bases, and reliably and richly 
communicate with the team.  
Collaboration allows participants to 
impose a shard view, apply specific 
understandings and meanings, and evolve their 
own organizing approaches to a problem 
(Turoff et al. 1997). A collaborating team 
works together to support common objectives 
(Carver and Turoff 2007). Collaborating teams 
in general and pre-existing teams in particular 
share data, information, and knowledge via 
computational resources, and persistent 
databases for the purpose of taking an action 
on behalf of an organization (McQuay 2004). 
Organizations seek to increase collaboration 
for their crisis teams as it allows knowledge to 
be shared without exposure to risk, and it 
makes vital expertise more widely available.  
IT Support 
To support teams designed to respond 
to crisis, organizations seek to leverage 
advances in information technology. Currently 
IT support for these types of teams includes 
display systems (Hamblin 2003; Sarter and 
Schroeder 2001; Vicente 2003), intelligent 
support systems (Koester and Mehl 2003; 
Palmer and Degani 2001;Wischusen et al. 
2003), decision support systems (Smith, 
Johnson, and Paris 2004), and a wide variety 
of other technical solutions (Song 2006; Stoner 
et al. 2004). A particularly intriguing example 
of this type of support is a system for 
efficiently planning traversals of planetary 
surfaces by astronauts (Marquez et al. 2005). 
These advances can be classified as 
automation support to the team (e.g. an 
electronic checklist for an airplane flight crew 
responding to an engine fire), or collaboration 
support such as linking paramedics in the field 
to doctors at hospitals. While significant 
progress is occurring to give automated 
support to pre-existing teams in crisis, very 
little consideration has been given to 
enhancing the collaboration support for this 
type of team in crisis (Huang 2004; 
Nunamaker 1997). This lack of attention 
continues despite recent crisis studies that 
suggest that even simple tools for 
collaboration such as communication systems 
have performed poorly (Netten and van 
Someren 2006).  
Collaboration is essential in a crisis 
because of the nature of the task. Crises are 
unexpected, unpracticed, and unprogrammable 
(McKinney and Davis 2003). For example, for 
flight crews, an engine failure or low oil 
temperature on an engine may be an 
emergency, examples of crisis include being 
shot, a terrorist attack, or responding to novel 
combinations of technical systems failures. 
Emergencies are predefined and therefore 
amenable to automated support. With an 
emergency, responders know what is wrong. 
Responders can be trained to accomplish a 
specific process and automated IT systems can 
be designed to support the programmed 
response. Crisis, by its uniqueness, reduces the 
utility of automated support. The challenges in 
all three levels of crisis are figuring out what is 
happening, dealing with incomplete 
information, thinking through irrevocable 
decisions and making them before it‘s too late. 
As a result, automated support, while valuable, 
should not be the only available support for 
teams that face crisis. Collaboration with other 
human experts is necessary to aid problem 
discovery and to consider ramifications of 
responses. 
For these teams, collaboration typically 
occurs within one organization. For example, 
flightdeck crews use electronic checklists 
during routine and crisis operations that can be 
displayed and tracked by organizational 
members on the ground. Emergency room 
systems are developed by hospitals to provide 
real time support to the medical team in 
routine operations and during crisis situations. 
As a result the system can be tailored to a 
particular organization and can avoid the 
common design challenge of having to 
develop a system that is meaningful and useful 
to wide range of team members from various 
organizations.. 
A collaborative crisis IT system is the 
interface between an organization and its pre-
existing team, permitting both routine and 
crisis collaboration between physically distant 
organizational members and the team in crisis. 
Collaboration implies that the system brings 
organizational assets and the team together to 
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resolve the crisis. While team characteristics 
are important to IT design, understanding and 
supporting organizational crisis related 
activities is also vital to successful IT design.  
Collaboration for our type of pre-
existing team has distinct characteristics that 
must be considered in order to support them 
well. For example, collaboration with pre-
existing teams is mostly synchronous. Further, 
collaboration occurs within a pre-existing 
hierarchical structure within the pre-existing 
team. Finally, organizations identify 
individuals of the team that will be leaders and 
decision makers during the crisis (e.g. 
captains, officers, line officers etc.).  
Effects of Crisis on Teams and Individuals 
Before it is possible to consider IT 
enabled collaborative support for teams that 
face crisis, it is necessary to understand the 
crisis task. A crisis is an unexpected, low 
probability, uncertain, unpracticed event with 
life and death consequences under time 
pressure with potentially irreversible decisions 
(Pearson and Clair 1998; Rosenthal 1991). A 
crisis typically unfolds as a person has an 
intention, takes action, and misunderstands the 
world. Actual events fail to coincide with the 
intended sequence, and there is an unexpected 
outcome. A crisis typically involves three 
phases: prevention, response and recovery 
(Hale et al. 2005). Further, the crisis event is 
just one of many concurrent activities for 
which the team is responsible. These other 
activities or responsibilities, as well as the 
crisis event itself constitute a crisis event. 
System design must recognize these 
concurrent responsibilities. For example, flight 
deck teams must continue to operate aircraft 
systems, navigate, and communicate in 
addition to accomplishing crisis related tasks. 
While accomplishing these tasks, responders 
are under the influence of a number of well 
known psychological effects. Crisis affects 
individuals in a number of ways. Here, the 
individual and team effects are reviewed. A 
brief listing of these effects is shown below in 
Table 2. For a more complete review see 
Morrison et al. (1998) or Olson and Sarter 
(2001). 
Research has demonstrated a number of 
significant cognitive and behavioral effects of 
crisis on individuals. A crisis can narrow 
attention, information search, and deliberation 
or debate (Cohen 1980). Individuals focus 
attention on the immediate, highly structured 
task elements and avoid more important and 
more complex tasks (Morrison et al. 1998). 
The stress of a crisis limits the
 
Table 2: Psychological Challenges of Crisis 
narrows information search and restricts deliberation or debate  
restricts attention to immediate, highly structured task and not more important and complex tasks  
limits ability to notice patterns 
situations are difficult to remember in sufficient detail long enough to recognize the emerging pattern 
a lack or poor quality of cues makes it difficult to hypothesize the nature and severity of the problem 
perceptual narrowing, reduced use of available cues, decreased vigilance, reduction in working memory  
restricts the examination and evaluation of multiple possible hypotheses  
time is compressed, events seem ambiguous and uncertain 
changes the communication patterns of teams 
communication is upward (from subordinate to leader) 
Implicit communication increases 
teams shift from an egalitarian horizontal communication framework to a more classical hierarchical 
subordinates more willing to defer to authority 
group leader increases receptivity to information from subordinates 
new patterns of communication are necessary to correct errors during crisis 
prone to latch upon the first good idea that comes along 
time pressure is likely to inhibit joint problem solving 
members reach agreements sooner, but they make fewer offers and reach poorer joint outcomes 
important social or interpersonal cues (such as attention to others‘ requests or actions) are neglected 
likely to shift to a more individualistic self-focus, resulting in poorer overall team performance 
members may revert to well learned or dominant responses that may be quite inappropriate 
threat rigidity—restriction in information processing, constriction of control (Staw et al. 1981) 
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individual‘s ability to notice patterns, as the 
important features of a developing situation 
are difficult to remember in sufficient detail 
long enough to recognize the emerging pattern 
(Morrison et al. 1998). Poor quality of cues 
can make it difficult to generate reasonable 
hypothesis about the nature and severity of the 
problem (Olson and Sarter 2001). Crisis can 
lead to perceptual narrowing and a reduced use 
of available cues, decreased vigilance, and 
reduction in working memory capacity. 
Further, a reduction in attentional resources 
restricts the examination and evaluation of 
multiple possible hypotheses (Sarter and 
Schroeder 2001). As attention narrows, 
peripheral (less relevant) task cues are first 
ignored followed by restriction of more central 
or task relevant cues. Individuals display threat 
rigidity, a reliance on well learned or dominant 
responses that may be quite inappropriate 
(Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981). For 
individuals in crisis, time is compressed; 
information is incomplete ambiguous and 
uncertain. Individuals tend to miss important 
patterns as perception narrows and working 
memory is reduced. 
While these effects have been shown to 
lead to poorer performance, crisis behaviors do 
have some positive attributes. Cognitive 
absorption ability increases to allow 
individuals to work with more information, 
and narrowing of attention may help 
participants focus on a specific task without 
devoting mental resources to other tasks 
(Agarwal and Karahanna 2000). 
Crisis also has team effects. Individuals 
were less likely to help or assist others 
(Matthews and Canon 1975). Stress reduces 
subjects‘ ability to discriminate among people 
occupying different roles (Rotton et al. 1978). 
Time pressure inhibits joint problem solving 
(Walton and McKersie 1965) and leads to 
greater self-focused attention (Wegner and 
Giuiliano 1980). Under high time pressure, 
team members reach agreements sooner, but 
these solutions are typically sub optimal. Team 
tasks require attention to both direct task-
related activities and social or teamwork 
activities such as coordination and 
communication. Thus, the narrowing of 
attentional focus under stress may have both 
cognitive and social effects. As important 
social or interpersonal cues, (such as attention 
to others‘ requests or actions) are neglected, 
team performance suffers. In fact, Driskell, 
Salas, and Johnston (1999) found that team 
members were less likely to maintain a broad 
team perspective under stress and were more 
likely to shift to a more individualistic self-
focus, resulting in poorer overall team 
performance (Driskell et al. 2001). 
Crisis also affects team communication 
behaviors (Hale et al. 2005; Thompkins and 
Thompkins 2004). A review of team crisis 
research shows that crisis changes the 
communication patterns of teams. One change 
is that during a crisis more communication is 
upward (from subordinate to leader) than in 
routine operations. In addition, during a crisis, 
implicit communication increases and teams 
shift from an egalitarian horizontal 
communication framework to a more classical 
hierarchical and vertical structure (Weick 
1990). Similarly, Davis, Driskell and Salas 
(1991) found that crisis made subordinates 
more willing to defer to authority. They 
hypothesized that this increased deferment to 
centralized authority is due to both social 
comparison (the leader is of higher stature) 
and concentration of responsibility (the leader 
has to answer for this).  
Further, new patterns of 
communication are necessary for teams to 
correct errors during crisis. According to 
Weick (1990), in any crisis there is a high 
probability that false hypotheses will develop 
and persist. What is needed is diversity of 
inputs and hypotheses about ―what is going 
on‖ (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001) as a chief 
characteristic of early stage crisis is the 
ambiguity and uncertainty of the cues. The 
human mind naturally seeks to resolve 
dissonance (Festinger and Carlsmith 1959) and 
is therefore prone to latch upon the first 
―good‖ idea that comes along during a crisis 
(Jehn 1999). This is particularly likely to occur 
if someone in authority introduces the idea 
(Kern 1997). Weick (1990) suggests that it is 
largely through open exchange of messages, 
independent verification, and redundancy that 
the existence of false hypotheses can be 
detected and corrected. These studies suggest 
crisis increases and alters the communication 
among team members.  
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Outline 
Next, we suggest a comprehensive and 
theoretical set of principles to guide IT design 
of systems to support the collaboration needs 
of pre-existing teams that face crisis. These 
principles are derived from two main sources. 
The first is High Reliability Organizational 
research. The second, and less well known 
source, is from the aviation domain. It is 
known as Crew Resource Management (CRM) 
research. The collaborative IT system must 
support both organizational and team needs, 
HRO principles support the former, CRM 
principles the later. 
High Reliability Organization (HRO) 
research seeks to describe and improve the 
activities and processes for organizations that 
face crisis (Bourrier 1996; Fiol and O‘Connor 
2003, Swanson and Ramiller 2004; Vogus and 
Welbourne 2003). This research suggests five 
activities. These include preoccupation with 
failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations, 
sensitivity to operations, commitment to 
resilience, and deference to expertise. 
Supporting crisis teams with IT should be 
based on these five organizational 
characteristics.  
While support for these organizational 
activities is important to crisis team success, it 
is also valuable to consider what might, by 
contrast, be labeled team-only needs. The 
activities of teams in crisis have been the 
object of military and airline flightdeck 
research for 25 years. This research effort, 
labeled Crew Resource Management (CRM), 
suggests that team-only needs might include 
situational awareness, decision making, 
communication, team work, resource use and 
leadership.  
Many of the following examples of HRO and 
CRM principles are from the aviation domain. 
The aviation community performs thousands 
of successful flights under difficult conditions 
and this research setting has matured to the 
point where a wide range of cases and 
examples have been written (Ginnett 1993; 
Helmreich, Merritt, and Wilhelm 1999). These 
examples and insights have been applied 
beyond the flightdeck--to teams solving 
organizational problems, emerging 
management teams, and IT teams that develop 
and maintain large scale computer programs  
(Boehm-Davis, Holt, and Seamster 2001; 
Davies 2001). The principles for a Crisis IT 
system for each field are listed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Principles of a Crisis IT system 
HRO Principles 
Record widespread and detailed accounts of near misses or errors that captures new attributes 
Track and display a wide variety of unsimplified data and disconfirming evidence for a variety of expert 
interpretation by team and organizational participants 
Increase the visibility of operational performance measures that lead to operational enhancements and build 
an IT system to adapt to these operational enhancements 
Create a flexible system that enables simultaneous action and analysis with mental simulation of courses of 
action for both team and organizational participants 
Identify, and alert experts with on going problems and support collaboration and analysis between crisis 
team and experts 
CRM Principles 
The system should be simple to use and not overly filter or over process the original data 
Help reduce mental effort by supporting feature matching and adaptive story telling.  
Display historical trends, minimize calculations, and support chunking of information in order to reduce 
cognitive overload 
Provide a mechanism to direct the attention of an operator to important events while minimizing the 
cognitive costs of interruption 
Mitigate the tendency of decision makers to attend to only confirming information 
Compensate for deficiencies in action selection and adaptively support the multiple cycles of decision 
making 
Enable and support communication value sharing 
Aid increased vertical communication, effective dissent, and alternative hypothesis generation during crisis 
Enhance accuracy and sharing of common models on the state of affairs 
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CCIT SYSTEM GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
HRO-Organizational Activities and CCIT 
System Principles 
Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld (1999) 
originated the HRO framework. High 
reliability organizations operate under 
constantly threatening conditions. HROs are 
typically interactively complex with 
unpredictable, but highly dependent 
interactions of subsystems (Perrow 1994). 
These organizations are labeled highly reliable 
because they have lower than expected 
accidents or incidents. Typical organizations 
cited as HROs are nuclear power aircraft 
carriers, air traffic control centers, and power 
plants, organizations that operate large 
physical objects. Interestingly each of these 
organizations employs pre-existing teams. 
These organizations are not free of errors, but 
errors do not disable it (Van den Eede, Van de 
Walle, and Rutkowski 2006). HROs seem to 
share a number of activities and processes. Of 
the five HRO principles described below, the 
first three address crisis prevention while the 
fourth deals with response and the fifth speaks 
to crisis recovery. 
1. Preoccupation with failure  
Members of HROs are anxious about 
failure and distrust success. As a result, they 
constantly seek to identify lapses or minor 
incidents that, if ignored, might later reoccur 
and contribute to a crisis. This preoccupation 
with failure is impervious to success and does 
not become stale. Members of HROs 
recognize that success can narrow perception 
and breed overconfidence. This misplaced 
confidence in judgment and in its existing 
procedures can limit necessary changes to the 
organization and its processes.  
One way HROs fight the lethargy of 
success is by building and motivating 
participation in attribution-free error reporting 
procedures. Anyone in the organization can 
report errors of any magnitude and are assured 
that those errors will not lead to sanction. 
These error reports are never automatically or 
thoughtlessly processed by the HRO. Rather 
the data collected are turned into active 
incident reviews and in depth analysis that are 
widely communicated.  
An error reporting system derived from 
a preoccupation with failure occurs in the 
airline industry (Chidester 2003). The Aviation 
Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is one 
national system, and all major airlines have 
their own internal systems. Pilots make inputs 
to the systems via anonymous reports (see 
ASRS at http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/). Data from 
these systems are then analyzed by trainers 
and researchers. Their reports are widely 
shared and the results of the studies have had 
significant impacts (Gunther 2003). Results 
from ASRS lead to new error frameworks and 
mitigation processes (Chidester 2003). 
Recently, these reports have helped build a 
model of communication error in abnormal 
situations (Haney and Gertman 2003; Muthard 
and Wickens 2003). 
These near misses and errors may 
contain warnings of future problems but in the 
din of daily activity appear as only weak 
signals of impending crisis. The IT system 
must be designed to find and amplify these 
weak signals for the crisis team and their 
collaborators to notice. Unfortunately, weak 
signals, by their nature, are not readily found 
as they defy easy classification or 
categorization. If categories or attributes of 
errors were already known to the organization, 
the errors that occur would also be known and 
procedures established to respond. For 
example, jet engines break down, and 
therefore airlines have learned to classify these 
failures as engine problems. However, most 
weak signals are not easily classified (e.g. a 
small wing crack might be classified by length, 
thickness, location or some other dimension). 
As a result, most organizations can not 
respond until the wing crack leads to a break 
and a crisis occurs. Thus, the crisis IT system 
should permit detailed descriptions or detailed 
reporting of odd events, near misses, and weak 
signals. From these details, common attributes, 
such as the length of a ―must repair‖ crack can 
later emerge, and teams can be trained to 
respond effectively. Once these new attributes 
are known, tolerances can be set for future 
inspections and reporting, procedures can be 
written for teams to use, and attention can shift 
to finding new attributes or categories.  
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System principle 1:  
Record widespread and detailed 
accounts of near misses or errors that captures 
new attributes 
2. Reluctance to simplify 
High reliability organizations do not 
simplify the complex events and processes in 
which their teams participate. Although all 
coordination requires some degree of 
simplification, in HROs, participants minimize 
this simplification and constantly seek to see 
more, and render more complete and detailed 
their understanding of their actions, processes 
and the environment. Further, when actions are 
taken or new processes put into place, they 
avoid seeking confirming evidence that their 
actions were appropriate. Rather, they seek 
disconfirming evidence and new sources of 
data that expectations and experience can 
conspire to hide.  
HROs generate disconfirming evidence 
for their crisis teams by assigning members 
with varied and overlapping backgrounds. The 
variety in backgrounds and experiences tends 
to increase scrutiny of data and thereby 
increase the variety of what can be noticed. 
With varied backgrounds comes varied 
experiences and expectations and skepticism 
of simplification. By creating teams with 
members who have overlapping experiences 
the team is more able to communicate what 
they notice and see a more complete 
perspective on their actions and the 
environment. In addition to the variety of the 
team, the search for disconfirming evidence is 
also enhanced by a varied search of a wide 
variety of sources. Therefore, an IT system 
that limits simplification would have a variety 
of sensors that records a variety of data for a 
variety of participants.  
System principle 2:  
Track and display a wide variety of 
unsimplified data and disconfirming evidence 
for a variety of expert interpretation by team 
and organizational participants 
3. Widespread sensitivity to operations  
HROs value operations above strategy. 
This focus on operations, or processes (e.g. 
communication) is designed to find hidden or 
underlying lessons about weaknesses in the 
operation. These latent failures may be found 
in many operational areas including poor 
supervision, inadequate procedures, and 
deficient training. HROs also demonstrate 
their commitment to operations by their focus 
on correcting even minor issues. The result is 
continuous improvement in operations. To 
sustain this incremental improvement, HROs 
seek operational suggestions from the entire 
organization. They widely disseminate and 
seek feedback on both operational 
performance and performance measures. This 
operational precedence is apparent in other 
ways-- in the interest devoted to even small 
interruptions in operations, in the numerous 
meetings on operational status, and in 
organization structure designed to broadly 
distribute real time data about operations. The 
DERMIS system introduced earlier also calls 
for sensitivity to operations (Turoff et al. 
2004). That system suggests collection and 
analysis of event logs that track courses of 
action during a crisis. This collection of events 
would be in real time. 
Effective hospital emergency rooms are 
committed to operations and studies are 
beginning to emerge that apply HRO 
principles to hospitals (Gaba 2005; McKeon, 
Oswaks, and Cunningham 2006). Doctors and 
administrators collect and collaborate on a 
wide variety of performance data to track 
patient progress and optimize diagnosis under 
crisis and expensive equipment use. Patient 
surveys are collected, and inputs from the 
entire organization are routinely obtained in 
order to improve operational processes. 
Despite constant strategic turmoil on 
insurance, liability, and government 
intervention issues, emergency room 
procedures are continually improved by the 
organization‘s commitment to operations. 
IT systems supporting teams in crisis 
should be designed to widely disseminate the 
state of current operations within the 
organization. The system should make 
operational data, training schedules, equipment 
use and other process information increasingly 
available for oversight and improvement. This 
should result in improvements to operational 
procedures from a variety of sources. In 
addition, one implication of continual process 
change is that the IT system itself must 
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change. Therefore, the system must be flexible 
enough to adapt to changes to operations. 
System principle 3:  
Increase the visibility of operational 
performance measures that lead to operational 
enhancements and build an IT system to adapt 
to these operational enhancements 
4. Commitment to resilience 
HROs are built on the premise that 
error is unavoidable. As a result, HRO 
managers take delight in putting out fires. 
Unlike managers in other organizations who 
see fire fighting as a breakdown of planning 
and a sap on resources, HRO managers know 
that recovery from mistake is their primary 
activity. Because of this priority they seek 
deep knowledge of their systems, processes 
and people. In addition, they excel at adapting 
to swift feedback, learning quickly without 
multiple errors, recombining existing 
responses, and mentally simulating courses of 
action. Further, they have learned to act while 
diagnosing and to adapt to threats based on 
feedback from action.  
The professional aviation community 
has realized that error is inevitable. In fact, one 
report estimates the frequency of pilot error at 
5-10 mistakes per hour (Amalberti 1996). As a 
result, flight systems, training, technical 
systems, and procedures are designed to 
respond and recover from these errors. Further, 
pilots are taught detailed knowledge about 
their aircraft systems, and their environment in 
order to more accurately diagnose crisis and 
think through courses of action. 
System principle 4:  
Create a flexible system that enables 
simultaneous action and analysis with mental 
simulation of courses of action for both team 
and organizational participants 
5. Deference to expertise 
As implied earlier, HROs intentionally 
employ a wide variety of expertise to avoid 
simplification when responding to crisis. Not 
mentioned earlier is how HROs are organized 
to deploy that expertise. Expertise is not 
employed in a stiff organizational structure, 
rather experts are expected to self organize 
around a problem. In addition, they are 
permitted to make decisions and commitments 
without multiple levels of supervision 
common in more hierarchical organizations. 
By pushing responsibility and authority down 
and out to where the organization meets its 
environment errors are caught earlier and 
problems more rapidly addressed. Moreover, 
when the signals emanating from the crisis are 
noticed, experts can find the problem and 
resolve it at a low level. Quick, accurate, and 
expert decisions by those closest to the action 
are emphasized. Westrum call this coordinate 
leadership (Westrum 1997). In the DERMIS 
model for large scale emergency response this 
need is labeled Open Multi Directional 
Communications. It is based on the concept 
that during an emergency there is no way to 
predict what information is going to be needed 
and who is going to need it. That system 
recognizes that online communities of experts 
responding to a crisis will need a collaborative 
communication system far beyond the 
primitive group communication such as 
discussion lists and email in use today.  
An example of collaboration with 
organizational expertise can be seen in outage 
planning at a nuclear power plant (Bourrier 
1996). The plant, Diablo Canyon, had no 
detailed plan or predetermined structure to 
deal with a power outage. Instead, the plant 
depended on delegation of power to experts 
supported by the complete availability of top 
management. This flexibility permits problems 
to quickly receive attention and appropriate 
collaboration to emerge. 
To support better use of expertise the 
IT system for teams in crisis must permit data 
and analysis to migrate to appropriate experts. 
It should encourage crisis teams close to the 
action to alert the right experts in the 
organization about anomalies. As a result, 
exception reporting, and other signals of 
problems should not just go to team members 
or executives but be shared widely within the 
organization. This collaboration or ―reach 
back‖ capability is a key concept in 
responding to large scale disasters and military 
operations (Chumer and Turoff 2006, Neal 
2000). 
In addition, the IT system must be 
configurable to support the unique 
collaboration needs of each crisis. In contrast 
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to this need for unique structures, traditional 
IT systems typically have the effect of making 
organization decision making rigid and 
predefined. The goal for a crisis system should 
be to support the needs of both the crisis team 
and their organizational expert collaborators. 
Rather than emphasizing planning, an HRO 
builds IT systems that can change with the 
circumstances and handle new communication 
processes on the fly.  
Deference to expertise, like the other 
four HRO principles, is an organizational 
principle. This is not the same idea as the 
individual behavior mentioned earlier labeled 
deference to authority. Individuals on teams 
during crisis tend to be more upward and 
classically hierarchical in communication. 
However, organizations supporting those 
teams should rely on deference to experts, 
allowing experts to self organize and 
collaborate with the team. 
System principle 5:  
Identify, and alert experts with on 
going problems and support collaboration and 
analysis between crisis team and experts 
CRM--Team Activities and CCIT System 
Principles 
Crew Resource Management (CRM) 
seeks to find ways of mitigating human error 
on the flightdeck (Wiener et al. 1993). Insights 
from CRM have been credited with significant 
reductions in aviation related mishaps and are 
currently being exported to non aviation 
domains such as operating rooms, merchant 
navy, and fire fighting 
(http://www.wright.edu/isap/). One goal of this 
current study is to bring CRM insights to the 
attention of the crisis and IT research 
communities. 
CRM accepts individual error as 
inevitable, but attempts to mitigate error by 
training in decision making, communication, 
and situational awareness as well as other 
topics (Helmreich and Foushee 1993). These 
topics form the conceptual breadth of CRM, 
but CRM is also a methodology for employing 
the concepts. This method involves 
indoctrination and awareness training, practice 
with feedback, and continuous reinforcement. 
The method frequently employs flight 
simulators to mimic actual emergencies and 
crises, and instruction by domain experts who 
have been educated on the CRM principles. 
Finally, CRM involves both individual as well 
as team capabilities. In fact, every CRM topic 
has both an individual and team component. 
For example, in decision making one pilot may 
make ―the decision‖ but all crewmembers on 
the team have input and other responsibilities. 
CRM has been shown to be so effective that 
both International and United States federal 
oversight agencies now require CRM training 
for flight crews (see ICAO 2002; FAR Part 
121). Recently CRM insights have been 
applied to medical teams (Gaba 2005; 
Helmreich 2000; Sexton, Thomas, and 
Helmreich 2000). 
The principles of CRM can be clustered 
into three general categories: decision making, 
communication, and situational awareness. 
Here we explain each, how it is used in 
aviation as an example for crisis in general, 
and the principles of an IT system designed to 
support this team activity in any domain. CRM 
has also developed principles beyond decision 
making, communication, and situational 
awareness such as workload sharing, stress, 
leadership and others (Helmreich and Foushee 
1993). These less central, less commonly 
accepted activities are not discussed here in 
order to focus IT system design on the most 
essential activities. The principles outlined 
below apply to both the physically collocated 
team (e.g. the paramedics) and the extended 
team (e.g. the doctors standing by in the 
emergency room). 
CRM literature is largely absent from 
the information systems crisis response 
research domain. Interested readers are 
directed to several texts (Kern 2001; Salas et 





6. Decision Making 
CRM models of decision making in 
crisis domains typically identify two primary 
phases: situation assessment (what is 
happening), and action selection (what to do 
about it) (Tolcott 1992). More specifically, 
situation assessment includes cue detection, 
cue interpretation, and integration, while 
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action selection subsumes hypothesis 
generation and selection (Smith et al. 2004). 
The decision making process is described 
elsewhere as observe, orient, decide, and act 
(Hammond 2001; Turoff et al. 2006). This 
process forms a loop when feedback creates 
information input for another round of the 
decision process (Transport Canada 2002). 
Although one member of a team is typically 
responsible for the decision, the decision 
making process is considered a team process 
as others on the team inform, check, and 
deliberate with the decision maker. 
Within the aviation community, 
decision making instruction emphasizes both 
individual characteristics such as decisiveness, 
assertiveness, and critical thinking as well as 
team attributes like legitimate dissent, think 
aloud, and debate (for a more complete 
exposition on flightdeck decision making see 
Transport Canada 2002 and Wiener, Kanki, 
and Helmreich 1993). Moreover, CRM 
recognizes that making a decision during a 
crisis requires the crew to overcome a number 
of significant emotional and cognitive 
challenges listed earlier in Table 1.  
To compensate for these limitations, a 
crisis IT system should support a wide range 
of decision making activities and processes. 
Fortunately, supporting the decision making 
aspect of the crisis has received considerable 
research attention compared to the other seven 
crisis activities described here (see Cannon-
Bowers and Salas 1998; Kern 2001). Although 
few systems have been constructed explicitly 
for team crisis decision making, experimental 
and theoretical studies have suggested the 
following six distinct principles for supporting 
decision making of teams in crisis with IT.  
Simplify data, minimize filtering 
Morrison et al. (1998) conducted an 
empirical study of tactical displays for naval 
officers responding to simulated threats. The 
officers seemed to prefer systems that 
displayed decision making data that was not 
heavily filtered or preprocessed (Hutchins et 
al. 1996, Morrison 1998). They favored data in 
its basic or original form (velocities, heading, 
range etc.) and not summed or fused into more 
complex abstract concepts such as threats or 
planning forms. In a study with similar 
findings Vicente (2003) reported that in health 
care, professionals seemed to perform better 
with less complex systems. That study 
suggests that serious medical errors were 
intercepted more often with simple systems in 
contrast to more sophisticated systems. One 
explanation is that more complex systems are 
given unwarranted prestige and diagnoses by 
these systems were not as often questioned as 
they should be. 
System principle 6:  
The system should be simple to use and 
not overly filter or over process the original 
data 
Support feature matching and story telling  
Experienced decision makers on pre-
existing teams seem to rely of two basic 
strategies for decision making in a crisis 
(Klein 1993). The most common strategy is to 
match the problem features of the crisis to 
known problem types. If this fails, decision 
makers tend to create a story that succinctly 
explains the situation and provides guidance 
on necessary next steps. In feature matching, 
the pattern or story, once recognized, 
immediately suggests a course of action 
without consideration of alternatives. In story 
telling, once a story is generated, the decision 
maker begins to act on that story and 
continually evaluates and adjusts the story 
until the crisis is resolved. As a result, the 
crisis system should support feature matching 
and adaptive story telling by helping the 
decision makers to categorize the crisis 
according to features, to record or edit the 
working story and to integrate the available 
information into a context or story, which 
may include a history of events, the presumed 
goals and capacities of key systems, potential 
risks, and opportunities..  
System principle 7:  
Help reduce mental effort by 
supporting feature matching and adaptive story 
telling.  
Reduce cognitive overload 
One of the most significant limitations 
on decision making during a crisis is the 
cognitive overload highlighted in Table 1. As a 
result, the crisis IT system should be designed 
to reduce this load. One technique for the 
system is to represent physical object (e.g. 
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aircraft, patients, uranium levels) data as 
trends over time or on other scales. This will 
help the decision maker be more informed as 
changing quantities of physical objects will be 
displayed and not committed to memory and 
compared over time. 
Another technique is to minimize 
manipulations or calculations by the decision 
making team (Tolcott 1992). For example, 
during a decent a pilot often must calculate 
whether the current rate of descent will be 
sufficient to arrive at a point in space at the 
correct altitude.  
A final method to reduce overload is 
for the system to support well known 
categorizing and chunking of information. For 
example systems should support categories of 
malfunctions, categories of procedures, and 
categories of crisis checklists. As the 
flightdeck team completes a checklist on gear 
malfunctions the flight deck team and the 
collaborating experts on the ground can both 
immediately display the next entire checklist 
using aviation classification shorthand. 
Another way to reduce mental workload by 
categorizing information is to display 
scenarios. For example the system should 
allow teams to conduct ―what if‖ analysis such 
as displaying fuel consumed if an aircraft has 
to divert away from one airport to go to 
another. Displays of physical objects, 
calculations, and categorization by IT systems 
can reduce cognitive overload. 
System principle 8:  
Display historical trends, minimize 
calculations, and support chunking of 
information in order to reduce cognitive 
overload (Solodilova et al. 2003)  
Direct attention efficiently 
Crisis team members must continually 
scan their environment as they resolve a crisis. 
This requires team members to continually 
shift their attention among a number of 
ongoing tasks. As a result, a key risk is that an 
important cue will be missed. Therefore, an IT 
crisis system should be designed to aid the 
team by altering members to important cues 
when needed. 
For example, a new head mounted 
display for anesthesiologists will include the 
display of an alert if key patient information 
dips below specified levels (Sanderson et al. 
2005). Anesthesiologists on the operating team 
are required to monitor a wide variety of data 
sources and participate with other surgical 
members on the team and can have their 
attention diverted from key data.  
These cues should be immediately 
obvious and should not require the user to take 
action in order to obtain important information 
(e.g. selecting windows, activating pop ups). 
The crisis system should be simple and have a 
single indicator to show if an alarm is present 
and waiting.  
System principle 9:  
Provide a mechanism to direct the 
attention of an operator to important events 
while minimizing the cognitive costs of 
interruption (Holbrook 2003)  
Reduce confirmation bias  
As mentioned earlier, during a crisis, 
team members tend to latch onto an early 
hypothesis and maintain it despite evidence to 
the contrary. This is a form of confirmation 
bias where decision makers become biased to 
data that support their pattern or hypothesis 
and appear deaf to disconfirming data. This 
can be particularly dangerous during a crisis 
when team members do not have the cognitive 
resources to evaluate alternative explanations. 
As a result, the system should help team 
members to recognize if a hypothesis does not 
fit the crisis situation. For example, in the 
study of naval decision makers mentioned 
earlier, the crisis system was designed to flag 
misfit objects in a different color (where a 
misfit object might be an aircraft that was 
labeled hostile, but did not continue to behave 
according to that profile). 
System principle 10:  
Mitigate the tendency of decision 
makers to attend to only confirming 
information (Morrison et al. 1998)  
Adaptively aid diagnosis and action 
selection cycles 
As mentioned earlier, most CRM 
decision making research for experienced 
decision makers in crisis suggests that experts 
use pattern matching rather than more formal 
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decision models to diagnose a situation. They 
seem to almost immediately recognize a 
situation and act rather than develop 
alternatives, apply criteria, and determine a 
solution that formal models suggest. However, 
several studies have suggested that even when 
a situation is accurately perceived, experienced 
decision makers, when confronted with a once 
in a lifetime crisis, can revert to novice like 
performance when selecting a course of action 
(McKinney and Davis 2003; Simmel and 
Shelton 1987). As a result, the crisis system 
should be designed to help the decision makers 
evaluate alternative actions.  
One of the design suggestions for the 
large scale DERMIS system is for system 
adaptation (Turoff et al. 2004). The system 
adapts to the ongoing crisis as situations are 
assessed and actions selected. This adaptation 
takes several forms—letting participants know 
who else is concerned with a particular issue at 
this time, finding information the individual 
should be aware of prior to action selection, 
and helping users adapt their information 
search. The adaptive system supports the 
ongoing cycle of decisions and actions beyond 
the first situation assessment.  
System principle 11:  
Compensate for deficiencies in action 
selection and adaptively support the multiple 
cycles of decision making (McKinney and 
Davis 2003)  
7. Communication  
Communication in CRM is defined as a 
process of exchanging ideas with verbal or non 
verbal means. The CRM community uses the 
classic objective ―sender-receiver‖ model to 
explain communication and suggest 
challenges. This practical and measurable 
perspective implies that communication occurs 
when a signal leads to a common 
understanding for both sender and receiver. In 
addition, CRM trains pilots on the non-
objective aspects of communication including 
the desire of participants to avoid looking 
foolish, that people respond to both feelings 
and facts, and the importance of trust 
(Transport Canada 2002). Finally, CRM 
identifies two roles that communication plays. 
First, communication is the process that allows 
teams of pilots to catch and correct errors and 
prevent them from exploding into crisis 
(Hackman 1990; Helmreich, Merritt, and 
Wilhelm 1999). Second, communication 
supports all the other team activities on the 
flightdeck such as decision making, workload 
sharing, error detection, and situational 
awareness (Sampson 1999).  
Recent CRM studies have suggested 
that communication for teams before they face 
crisis is enhanced by the expression of 
communication values (McKinney et al. 2003, 
McKinney et al. 2005). Communication values 
are catalysts for effective early performance of 
teams. Like all values, communication values 
are standards against which actions and 
outcomes are judged; they are positive ideals 
about communication. Communication values 
include openness, questioning, candor, 
attentiveness, respect, support, appreciation, 
calmness, confirmation, assertiveness, non 
judgmentalness, and turn taking. Early 
expression of communication values provides 
necessary guidance for team members on how 
information will be exchanged, the context in 
which communication is to be employed. Once 
these values are surfaced, communication 
processes can develop rapidly (Hirokawa and 
Poole 1996).  
System principle 12:  
Enable and support communication 
value sharing 
While communication helps prevent 
crisis, CRM also holds that crisis changes 
communication (Jehn 1995; McKinney et al. 
2005; Te‘eni 2001). One change is that during 
a crisis more communication is upward (from 
subordinate to leader) than in routine 
operations. In addition, during a crisis, implicit 
communication increases and teams shift from 
an egalitarian horizontal communication 
framework to a more classical hierarchical and 
vertical structure where subordinates defer 
more willingly to authority (Davis et al. 1991; 
Weick 1990). Further, crisis also caused the 
group leader to increase receptivity to 
information from subordinates. New patterns 
of communication are necessary to correct 
errors during crisis. In any crisis there is a high 
probability that false hypotheses will develop 
and persist (Weick 1990). To overcome this, 
what is needed is diversity of inputs and 
hypotheses about situation assessment (―what 
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is happening‖) (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). 
However, the human mind naturally seeks to 
resolve dissonance (Festinger and Carlsmith 
1959) and is prone to latch upon the first 
―good‖ idea that comes along during a crisis 
(Jehn 1999). It is largely through open 
exchange of messages, independent 
verification, and redundancy that the existence 
of false hypotheses can be detected and 
corrected (Weick 1990).  
System principle 13: 
Aid increased vertical communication, 
effective dissent, and alternative hypothesis 
generation during crisis 
8. Situational Assessment 
Within the CRM community, 
situational awareness is defined as an accurate 
perception of reality (Transport Canada 2002). 
According to this view, every crew member 
develops a "Theory of the Situation", an 
assumption about the current state of affairs. 
Further, if reality and an individual's Theory of 
the Situation‖ differ significantly, a loss of 
situational awareness (SA) occurs and an error 
chain could begin (Transport Canada 2002). 
As defined, situational awareness 
appears to be an individual attribute. However, 
CRM extends situational awareness to be a 
team principle. This shared SA occurs when 
the mental model of each member corresponds 
to the actual state of affairs. To ensure a shared 
SA, team members communicate to update 
each other‘s SA, and if the communication 
remains effective, team members develop and 
maintain a common, shared mental model of 
the situation. The resulting shared SA is vital 
to performance according to a number of 
studies (Serfaty et al. 1998). For example, 
Orasanu (1990) found that the communication 
between the captain and other crew members 
facilitates the building of a shared SA and is 
essential to high team performance. On the 
other hand, many crew difficulties arise when 
individual SAs do not overlap or when team 
members do not recognize that other members 
hold a different SA. Further, collaborating 
experts in the organization may not share the 
SA of the pre-existing team. 
An aviation example of an IT system 
designed to enhance shared SA is an electronic 
checklist. These are lists of actions to 
accomplish at predetermined times during a 
flight and to respond to well documented 
emergencies. Crews routinely accomplish 10-
20 checklists per flight and frequently practice 
the 20 to 30 emergency checklists during 
simulated flights. Checklists keep crew 
members on the same page, and allow both 
crewmembers to see at a glance a common 
reference on how many steps or items remain, 
the next item, and what has been 
accomplished. These checklists became 
electronic in order to allow the pilots to mark a 
step as skipped or to take steps out of order 
and not have to remember what was skipped. 
The move from paper to electronic checklists 
also made it much easier during an emergency 
to interrupt a checklist to accomplish another 
list and return to correct step in the first 
checklist. Checklists enhance the shared 
mental model of crewmembers by providing a 
common model on the current state of affairs. 
With this system, greater collaboration with 
ground based support is possible. The status 
(complete, postponed, and incomplete) of each 
item should be transmitted to these experts to 
enhance the shared SA among the extended 
team. 
System principle 14: 
Enhance accuracy and sharing of 
common models on the state of affairs 
SUMMARY 
To date, little work has investigated 
supporting the collaborative needs of pre-
existing teams that face crisis. The uniqueness 
of the crises event suggests that in addition to 
automated support, teams that face crisis 
would benefit from real time collaboration 
from other experts in the organization. 
The goal of this investigation was to 
develop an initial list of guiding principles for 
IT systems to support the collaboration need of 
teams in crisis. To accomplish this, two main 
frameworks of crisis were reviewed. The first, 
High Reliability Organizations, suggests that 
to mitigate the effects of crisis, organizations 
should be preoccupied with failure, avoid 
simplifications, attend to operations, commit 
to resilience, and defer to expertise. The 
second, Crew Resource Management posits 
that crisis teams must effectively make 
decisions, communicate, and share situational 
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assessment to effectively response to crisis. 
Using these eight activities 14 specific guiding 
principles, of a CCIT system were presented.  
Future research should further refine 
this list, evaluate its completeness, and assess 
its generalizability. However, future studies 
will face the same challenge as the present 
one--empiricism is difficult. The uniqueness 
and risk of crisis makes it fundamentally 
difficult to collect a sufficient number of 
observations from one context or conduct 
experiments. On the other hand, as cockpit 
voice recorders and flight data recorders 
become more common, more scientific 
analysis of the system principles suggested 
here might be increasingly possible.  
APPENDIX 
General Design Principles and Specifications for DERMIS (Turoff et al. 2004) 
Design Principle 1 - System Directory: The system directory should provide a hierarchical 
structure for all the data and information currently in the system and provide a complete text 
search to all or selected subsets of the material. 
Design Principle 2 - Information Source and Timeliness: In an emergency it is critical that every 
bit of quantitative or qualitative data brought into the system dealing with the ongoing emergency 
be identified by its human or database source, by its time of occurrence, and by its status. Also, 
where appropriate, by its location and by links to whatever it is referring to that already exists 
within the system. 
Design Principle 3 - Open Multi - Directional Communication: A system such as this must be 
viewed as an open and flat communication process among all those involved in reacting to the 
disaster. 
Design Principle 4 - Content as Address: the content of a piece of information is what determines 
the address.  
Design Principle 5 - Up-to-Date Information and Data: Data that reaches a user and/or his/her 
interface device must be updated whenever it is viewed on the screen or presented verbally to the 
user. 
Design Principle 6 - Link Relevant Information and Data: An item of data and its semantic links 
to other data are treated as one unit of information that is simultaneously created or updated.  
Design Principle 7 - Authority, Responsibility, and Accountability: Authority in an emergency 
flows down to where the actions are taking place. 
Design Principle 8 – Psychological and sociological factors: Encourage and support the 
psychological and social needs of the crisis response team. 
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